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ABSTRACT
Organizational learning takes place through activities performed by individuals, groups,
and organizations as they gather and digest information, imagine and plan new actions,
and implement change. I examine the learning practices of companies in two industries --
nuclear power plants and chemical process plants -- that must manage safety as a major
component of operations and therefore must learn from precursors and near-misses rather
than exclusively by trial-and-error. Specifically, I analyze the logics underlying incident
reviews, root cause analysis teams, and self-analysis programs as revealed in
administrative documents, interviews, on-site observations, and collaborative workshop
discussions. In organizations with fragmentary, myopic, and disparate understandings of
how the work is accomplished, there are likely to be more failures to learn from operating
experience, recurrent problems, and cyclical crises. Enhanced learning requires a more
comprehensive set of lenses through which to understand past experience and to see new
possibilities. I discuss some examples of companies trying out new ways of thinking and
acting.
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INTRODUCTION
At one nuclear power plant, the Station Manager explained the plant's excellent safety
record by saying, "What we do around here doesn't always make sense" (Carroll& Perin,
1993). What he meant is that the ways people achieve and maintain good performance
are not easy to articulate within well-understood principles of organization and
management. In short, he found it difficult to explain these activities and practices to his
bosses (indeed, he might have to hide information to avoid trouble).
But why doesn't it make sense? Why should effective behaviors and activities not
be explicable and perhaps not discussible (cf, Argyris and Schon, 1996)? The central
argument of this paper is that the difficulty lies in the available "mental models" (e.g.,
Senge, 1990) or understandings of organizations, people, and technologies. When those
mental models legitimate only certain types of behaviors, and exclude whole classes of
effective behaviors, then there is need to broaden the models. When different knowledge
bases and viewpoints cannot be negotiated across levels of hierarchy and occupational
specialties, then organizations cannot make sense of events (Weick, 1995) in ways that
support effective learning.
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For example, during a visit to a nuclear power plant, a member of our research
team asked to see the organization chart, which we use regularly as a way of getting some
background context. The chart was dutifully handed over, but the respondent added that
the organization chart did not represent the way people really work at the plant. Instead,
he drew a set of intersecting circles very different in look and feel from an organization
chart (see Figure 1), suggesting that people have to communicate and work across
boundaries in more of a network or system. Later that year, at a meeting of the sponsor
representatives from our research program[ 1], I presented these drawings as a way to
illustrate a more organic form of organization different from the familiar "machine
bureaucracy." During the next coffee break, a Vice President from another nuclear power
utility approached me and expressed concern over the intersecting circles, saying "once
you let people out of their boxes, there will be chaos."
Insert Figure 1
These vignettes suggest that employees at different levels in the hierarchy can have
different understandings of how a plant operates, and as a result they may not
communicate easily (cf. Schein, in press). The source of the intersecting-circles
description was someone actively engaged in everyday operations at the worker level.
The source of concern about lack of control and letting people out of their boxes was a
Vice President located at corporate headquarters two hours drive from their nuclear
power plant. The Station Manager who said "what we do around here doesn't always
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make sense" is located in the middle, at the intersection of the plant and the corporation:
he understands what the plant does in order to succeed yet he perceives that his executive
bosses might not accept those activities as legitimate.
The above examples highlight an important issue for organizational learning: what
does it mean for an "organization" to "learn" or "know" something, apart from the
knowledge of individuals within the organization? Organizational knowledge is embodied
in physical artifacts (equipment, layout, data bases), organizational structures (roles,
reward systems, procedures), and people (skills, values, beliefs, practices) (cf, Kim, 1993;
Levitt and March, 1988; Schein, 1992). Different parts of the organization (e.g., plant vs.
corporate) "know" different things about how work is done. This is a necessary feature of
complex organizations where no one person can know enough about every specialty, nor
appreciate both the "big picture" and the details, yet there must be sufficient coherence or
alignment among these parts to operate effectively. Although organizations cannot learn
without people, organizational knowledge exists in the interdependencies among these
supporting and conflicting repositories of information.
In the remainder of this paper, I lay out a framework for organizational learning.
Organizational learning is a vast topic (e.g., Argyris and Schon, 1996; Cohen and Sproull,
1996; Levitt and March, 1988) and this paper restricts our focus in several ways. First, I
am less concerned with what is learned and who does the learning than with how that
learning is accomplished. This focuses the discussion on specific learning activities.
Second, I am more interested in sources of learning from analysis of an organizations'
own experiences and internal debates rather than learning by imitation, diffusion of
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technical innovations, benchmarking, exchange of best practices, or other external sources
of information. Third, I draw examples from two industries -- nuclear power plants and
chemical process plants -- that have to manage hazardous operations. I argue that this
makes their learning processes particularly challenging, because they cannot learn solely by
trial-and-error due to the catastrophic costs of severe accidents (March, Sproull, and
Tamuz, 1991; Weick, 1987). The analysis of incident reviews, root cause analysis, and
self-analysis programs leads to a discussion of new conceptual tools that can help
organizations rethink their learning activities.
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK
In order to understand organizational learning outcomes such as performance
improvements, it is important to examine the learning processes that are enacted within
work activities to produce those outcomes, and the learning resources that provide
capabilities for those activities (cf. resource-based theory of the firm, Penrose, 1968).
These are given schematic form in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2
Many researchers characterize learning as a generic feedback cycle (e.g., Argyris
and Schon, 1996; Kim, 1993; Kolb, 1984; Daft and Weick, 1984; Schein, 1987), and I
continue that approach by describing four ordered learning processes that take place
within and across individuals, groups, departments, organizations, and institutions. These
four processes are:
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1) Observing - noticing, attending, heeding, tracking;
2) Reflecting - analyzing, interpreting, diagnosing;
3) Creating - imagining, designing, planning; and
4) Acting - implementing, doing, testing.
This learning process cycle takes place at individual, group, departmental, organizational,
and institutional levels as various kinds of work activities are carried out, for example, in
efforts to verify one's own and others' work, plan of the day meetings, incident reviews,
post-job critiques, peer visits among plants, exchanges of good practices, and so forth.
Each activity requires resources -- such as time, information, know-how, tools, and
procedures -- that are continually developed, depleted, renewed, and changed, thus
changing learning capabilities along with achieving learning outcomes.
In high-hazard industries such as nuclear power plants, chemical production plants,
offshore oil drilling, and aviation, the nature of the technology and the twin goals of safety
and profitability define a unique set of organizational and managerial issues. By
comparison with typical manufacturing or service industries, there are greater management
challenges to maximize actors' abilities to avoid errors, recover quickly from problems,
and learn efficiently from precursors and incidents (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts,
1990; Sitkin, 1992; Weick, 1987). Nuclear power plants are the prototypical high-hazard
industry because of the potential for catastrophic consequences and the public dread of
radiation (Perrow, 1984; Slovic, 1987; Weart, 1988).
To maximize safe performance, designers rely on a defense-in-depth strategy.
With layers of barriers, designers anticipate possible threats, and to assure that these
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systems are "fail safe," critical safety functions performed by equipment and people are
duplicated. The safety strategy results in a complicated and highly interdependent
arrangement of dozens of major systems, hundreds of subsystems, and tens of thousands
of components whose operation, maintenance, and design changes are governed by
written procedures and layers of oversight. Such complexity obscures the impact of
particular actions, and the invisibility of latent defects (Reason, 1990) masks the state of
the entire system (Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1978): backup systems can be inoperable,
oversight can be ineffective, and other vulnerabilities can exist for years without discovery.
For example, in 1979 the Davis Besse nuclear power plant management discovered that
their auxiliary feedwater system had been inoperable for many years when the main
feedwater failed.
From the beginning of the nuclear power industry, design engineers appear to have
understood plant construction as a finite project that results in a production machine.
Once built and debugged, the plants were expected simply to run, a belief echoed by
nuclear utilities and regulators: "Technological enthusiasts heading the AEC [Atomic
Energy Commission] believed most accidents were too unlikely to worry about" (Jasper,
1990, p. 52). The Three Mile Island (TMI) event in 1979 constituted a "fundamental
surprise" (Lanir, 1986) for the nuclear power industry that cast doubt on that belief.
Neither the equipment nor the people functioned as predicted. A stuck-open valve,
coupled with ambiguous indicators of equipment status, additional faulty equipment, and
operators who had been trained to take particular actions based on an incorrect model of
the system, all led to cooling water being drained from the uranium in the reactor so that
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the fuel was exposed and partially melted. Because of this combination of problems, the
utility lost the use of a billion-dollar unit. The logic of design was shown to be flawed:
the complexity of the production system exceeded the capacity of a priori design
strategies.
TMI demonstrated the need to complement design logics with operating logics,
including learning-through-practice (Kemeny, 1979; Rogovin and Frampton, 1980). The
information needed to prevent the TMI event had been available from similar prior
incidents at other plants, recurrent problems with the same equipment at TMI, and
engineers' critiques that operators had been taught to do the wrong thing in particular
circumstances, yet nothing had been done to incorporate this information into operating
practices (Marcus, Bromiley, and Nichols, 1989). In reflecting on TMI, the utility's
president Herman Dieckamp said,
To me that is probably one of the most significant learnings of the whole
accident [TMI] the degree to which the inadequacies of that experience
feedback loop... significantly contributed to making us and the plant
vulnerable to this accident" (Kemeny, 1979, p. 192).
Learning is now a central activity in the nuclear power industry. In response to the
reports analyzing TMI, and under pressure of further regulatory action, the U.S. nuclear
power industry established the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to promote
safety and reliability through external reviews of performance and processes, training and
accreditation programs, events analysis, sharing of operating information and best
practices, and special assistance to member utilities (see Rees, 1994, for a highly favorable
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reading of INPO's role). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and World
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) share these goals and serve similar functions
worldwide.
In high-hazard industries, priority is placed on finding and fixing problems before
they become more serious. This emphasis is reinforced by regulatory practices that
consider it important for plants to identify their own problems before the regulators
discover them (and before they are discovered through a serious accident). Each plant has
ways to reflect on its own operating experience in order to identify problems, interpret the
reasons for these problems, and select corrective actions to ameliorate the problems. In
the next two sections of the paper, I will analyze closely the incident review program in a
nuclear power plant and the root cause analysis of repetitive performance problems in a
chemical process plant. These analyses reveal the kinds of resources and capabilities that
underlie organizational learning.
AN INCIDENT REVIEW PROGRAM AT A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Incident reviews are important vehicles for self-analysis, knowledge sharing across
boundaries inside and outside specific plants, and development of problem resolution
efforts. Incidents vary from seemingly minor slips with no outward manifestations to
highly consequential damage to equipment, safety system actuations, unplanned
shutdowns, and injuries to employees that must be reported to the regulator. Plants (and
regulators) classify these incidents into categories and expend different levels of resources
for analyzing and correcting problems. Special teams are formed to examine serious
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incidents, repeat incidents, or negative trends in greater depth, and may involve external
teams from corporate headquarters, regulators, INPO, IAEA, or WANO.
At an industry level, dissemination of incident reports and analyses is part of the
legacy of Three Mile Island and the mission of INPO. Both INPO and the NRC issue
various letters and reports to make the industry aware of incidents as part of operating
experience feedback, as does IAEA's Incident Reporting System. INPO, IAEA, and
WANO arrange for teams of experts to visit plants to provide various kinds of assistance.
For example, IAEA responds to member countries' requests for an international team of
experts to visit a plant in order to reanalyze a small number of important recent incidents
and gain new ways of understanding them.
Despite regulatory requirements, dissemination of best practices, and other
mechanisms that serve to establish and improve incident review programs at each plant,
each plant seems to carry out incident reviews in its own way. Thus, for example, there
are regulatory requirements for reporting more serious incidents, but the threshold for
reporting, documenting, and analyzing less serious incidents and whether this is carried
out by special staff or regular line employees, and by individuals or groups, is left up to
each plant. As illustrated below, plant employees may not recognize fully the assumptions
and logics built into the incident review program which may limit the learning process.
The Carver Incident Review Program
At one nuclear power plant, which we call by the pseudonym of "Carver," administrative
documents describe the incident review program as a search for "root cause": "the
primary or direct cause(s) that, if corrected, will prevent recurrence of performance
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problems, undesirable trends, or specific incident(s)." The documents give additional
detail about types of causes:
If the incident involved personnel error, the description should include
determination of cognitive personnel error (unintentional action perceived
to be correct prior to initiation) or procedure error (error in approved
procedure)... If the cause(s) is an equipment failure, the description of the
root cause should include the failure mode or mechanism (e.g., valve not
included in Preventive Maintenance program, therefore stem not being
lubricated, and subsequently corroded and broke).
A list of root cause categories is given:
component failure work control
man-machine interface work planning, procedure, documentation
communication work practices, techniques
training external cause
work organization environment
work schedule unknown, needs more investigation
Within each of the above cause categories, there are subcategories and examples given.
However, the detail and extensiveness of these subcategories varies by category: the
"component failure" category has pages of subcategories and examples, whereas the
category of"work organization" has only a few subcategories. Finally, the documents
specify that for review and approval: "The Root Cause Team will discuss the results of
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the investigation as soon as possible with the responsible manager. The Team should
normally have the concurrence of the manager in determining the corrective action(s)."
The Logic of the Incident Review Program
Although the Carver program appears very sensible and is undoubtedly similar to many
other programs in this industry and others, there are some issues that are hidden from view
by the assumptions and logics that underlie the program. First, the very concept of "root
cause" seems to focus attention on a single cause rather than an exploration of multiple
causes or chains of events. This has been called "root cause seduction" (Carroll, 1995)
because the idea of a singular cause is so satisfying to our desire for certainty and control.
In the Carver documents, recognition is given in an offhand way that there may be
cause(s), but the expectation is that a primary cause will be found. This expectation is
even built into the computer system that records root cause reports for tracking and
analysis which limits data entry to a single root cause. Interestingly, at this plant there was
a difference of opinion regarding the proper number of causes to include in a root cause
report. The majority believed that there should be only a few root causes, two or three at
most, in order to avoid "diluting" the impact of the report. The minority believed that a
more extensive list of causes would be helpful for learning and improvement.
Second, some kinds of causes are given more attention than others, based on how
well they are understood. The "component failure" designation has extensive detail,
serves as the source of many illustrative examples, and has special requirements for
interfacing with component problem tracking systems. Procedures and individual human
error are also called out for attention by serving as the source of examples and detailed
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instructions. These causes tend to be more immediate to the emergence of problems (at
the "sharp end" of systems, Reason, 1990) and better understood as causes and for
selecting corrective actions, i.e., we know how to "fix" these problems (solution-driven
search, Carroll, 1995). In contrast, more systemic and organizational causes that are
further back in time (not as "direct") are left more vague; the documents express a lesser
understanding and lesser salience of these causes by their lack of detail, lack of examples,
and lack of familiar corrective actions. Reliance on ready-made and available solutions
can become a trap when "band-aids" are used to fix symptoms or offer symbolic value but
fail to address underlying causes.
The fixing orientation is consistent with American managers' desires for certainty
and action. People are not encouraged to look at the linkages among problems and issues,
because it creates a feeling of overwhelming complexity and hopelessness in the face of
pressure to do something quickly. For example, one engineering executive at a U.S.
nuclear power plant commented that, "it is against the culture to talk about problems
unless you have a solution." The question is whether this approach works successfully
with complex, ambiguous issues that lack ready answers, or with diffuse organizational
and cultural processes that are poorly understood, or whether a different approach is
needed.
Third, the review and approval process forces the Root Cause Team to negotiate
with line management over the content of the report. The virtue of this requirement is that
line management must take responsibility for implementing change, and they must
therefore have opportunity to provide input and commit to the new actions. Everyone
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recognizes that it is easier to produce reports and analyses than it is to create effective
change. However, the danger of this approach is that needed change may get buried in
politics: the power resides in line management, who may fail to acknowledge issues that
reflect badly on them, diminish their status or power, or have solutions that are risky to
their own agendas. The anticipation of resistance from line management can lead to
sanitizing the report, which is a kind of"acceptability heuristic" (Carroll, 1995; Tetlock,
1985).
If we analyze the Carver program more deeply, the underlying cultural values and
assumptions begin to emerge (cf. Schein, 1992). The culture of nuclear power plants, as
in most technological organizations, emphasizes the importance of avoiding problems
through engineering design and managerial controls and, when necessary, fixing problems.
Typically, people who operate the technology are seen as a potential source of trouble that
must be controlled by designing people out of the system or providing procedures and
training to minimize human error. A joke is told about the new control room staffing
plans for the advanced design nuclear power plants. It consists of an operator and a dog.
The operator has one job: feed the dog. The dog has two jobs: keep the operator
company and, in case of emergency, keep the operator away from the control panel.
There is a presumption that organizations are like machines whose problems can
be decomposed into parts, the causes identified, and fixes put in place. The "fixing"
orientation looks for linear cause-effect relationships, simplifies problems by decomposing
them into well-understood components, and applies specialized knowledge to create
technical solutions. This is most clearly represented in Probabilistic Safety Analyses
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(PSA) which vividly reveal the expectation that events are enumerable, predictable, and
additive, like a complex wiring diagram. Although extremely useful for some purposes,
PSAs do not mirror the actual plant: for example, serious accidents nearly always involve
being outside the "design basis" or modeling assumptions in PSA (Rasmussen, 1990).
Rochlin and von Meier (1994) associate these assumptions and ways of thinking
with the engineering occupational subculture. Indeed, safety is most often conceptualized
as an engineering specialty, and most of the literature on safety focuses on equipment and
other technical concerns. In contrast, the operating subculture (of occupations that carry
out hands-on, real-time functions) has a less formal, more organic, and more dynamic view
of the plant. For example, Plant Managers may be more likely to write about safety from
a social and organizational perspective (e.g., Chiba, 1991). Schein (in press) suggests that
there are typically three subcultures in organizations: an operator culture or line
organization that considers work to involve interconnected systems and cooperation
among people; an engineering subculture that values technical, error-free solutions; and a
CEO subculture that focuses on the financial bottom line.
I held a workshop held at the Carver plant that explored the incident review
process, focusing on analysis of a particular recent incident in which a hot water pump
was taken out of service to repair an oil leak and then returned to service without the
motor being reconnected. The root cause analysis report listed as the root cause that the
Electrical Foreman, who is administratively responsible for reading the work order, had
failed to verify the work complete before giving up clearance to run the pump. Workshop
participants included employees from engineering, operations, maintenance, and other
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groups, and varied in hierarchical level. Although this was a visible recent incident at the
plant that everyone had heard about, it became evident that different participants knew bits
of additional information that generated a lively exchange of details, history, and
viewpoints.
With minimal prompting to look for causes beyond the immediate circumstances of
the incident, workshop participants were readily able to focus on why the Foreman and
several others had failed to prevent the incident, and to draw insights about organizational
and cultural issues. This included: (a) the complexity revealed in the numerous hand-offs
and layers of management, (b) the use of the same work order form to handle changed job
content, (c) the perceived time pressure from Daily Planning that was unnecessary, (d) the
fact that the Electrical Supervisor was standing over the Electrical Foreman holding the
work order so the Foreman assumed the Supervisor had checked, (e) the Supervisor was
new in the job and rank and politeness may have interfered with their communication, and
(f) the ways in which specialties optimize their own work without considering their impact
on overall plant goals. Each of these issues held lessons for the plant and suggestions for
ways to improve work practices.
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AT A CHEMICAL PLANT
Chemical plants, like nuclear power plants, are continuous process technologies with
significant hazards arising from toxic chemicals, high temperatures, explosions, etc. At
one chemical process plant, management was concerned enough about a long history of
costly operating problems, and enlightened enough, to request for the plant a root cause
analysis intervention that had begun recently to be offered by corporate employees.
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The Root Cause Analysis Intervention
The Root Cause Analysis intervention involved several trainers and two dozen employees
assembled for two weeks of effort; half the employees were from the plant, and half had
traveled from other operating units to participate in the intervention. These employees
were selected to span several different levels of hierarchy and kinds of functional
specialties ranging from experienced engineers to nontechnical administrative staff. The
intervention consisted of systematic training on how to analyze performance problems and
develop a root cause report, taught in the context of analyzing actual problems at the plant
and making recommendations to plant management and other important managers (this
was a visible event in the company).
This process began with an analysis of all the production losses that could be
identified and classified, and selection of six problems that had real "bottom-line"
importance to the plant. Each problem was assigned to one of six teams from the group,
selected to have both insiders and outsiders, technical and nontechnical members. Each
team's task was to analyze their problem and develop a report to management. The teams
received instructions each day in concepts and methods, coordinated to be most useful to
them as they proceeded in their analysis. Teams regularly reported their progress to the
whole group including tours of the workspace of each team (teams were encouraged to
"cheat" or learn from each other). After a week of training and work on the problems,
they returned to their jobs for a week and percolated their thinking. They then reconvened
for the second week with continued training and analysis culminating in a formal round of
18
presentations from each team made to each other and to plant management on the last day
of the workshop.
Analysis of the Intervention
The root cause analysis training appears to offer a set of simple ideas and tools. For
example, there is a careful separation of facts vs. beliefs or what is sometimes called the
ladder of inference. Participants are exhorted to be factual, i.e., to anchor their analyses
so that every argument can be demonstrated factually. A second tool is to use a list
divided into "is/is not" parts. For example, if some motors are wearing out too rapidly, an
extensive list of characteristics associated with the motors that are wearing out ("is") is
developed and compared against a list of characteristics associated with motors that are
not wearing out ("is not"). A third technique is to keep asking "why?" with the
expectation that this question will have to be answered six or more times (a classic Total
Quality Management technique). Similarly, instructions are given for developing time
lines, drawing flow charts, conducting interviews, and writing reports, lists of possible
causes are described to help stimulate thinking and provide shared categories, and the root
cause process itself is described in phases so that teams know where they are going, how
to get there, how to assess their progress, and how to anticipate and cope with the
frustration that often accompanies the process.
Although the training appears simple, the application of those ideas to complex
and ambiguous problems is very difficult. The ideas and tools actually build into a
discipline with rigorous logic and surprising leverage. Root cause analysis is not taught as
a formula, but as a kind of practice: it is the emergent connection of principles to the
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details of a particular context. Although directed at concrete problems that need
solutions, the real value of root cause analysis training is achieved by changing the way
people think about work and they way they seek information and communicate with
others. This has the benefit of reducing the introduction of new problems and solving
problems more quickly. Indeed, I was told that plants experienced substantial
improvements following a root cause intervention before solutions to the analyzed
problems were even implemented! We might hypothesize that becoming alert to a wider
range of plant conditions, developing a questioning attitude, thinking in more systemic
ways, communicating more readily with other groups, and believing that problems can be
addressed effectively were sufficient to introduce changes in behavior apart from specific
"fixes."
Observation of the team interactions as they progressed during their two weeks of
analysis revealed some interesting features of the intervention. First, analyzing any event
deeply enough into the chain of causes reveals a lot about how the organization really
works. Each of the six problems initially were defined and organized around equipment or
particular points in a chemical process, such as a pH control problem or a high failure rate
in centrifuge motors. As the investigations proceeded, the analysis led back into the
organizational and cultural systems of the plant, such as operator practices for adjusting
the equipment or taking equipment down for service whose idiosyncracies across shifts
were unrecognized.
Second, as they gathered information about the presenting problem, its context and
history, teams uncovered many other problems that turned out to be unrelated, but could
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be listed and later addressed. In simply identifying the way a particular process worked
and laying out a diagram, which typically involved consulting manuals and diagrams and
interviewing knowledgeable employees, numerous examples were found where people
thought they knew the chemistry of the system, the current physical layout of equipment,
how people actually work with the equipment, etc., but they were mistaken. More
importantly, issues surfaced around how designers and operators live in different "thought
worlds" (Dougherty, 1990; Schein, in press) and rarely communicate; even different
operators failed to tell each other (or to ask) what they needed to know. Incomplete and
incorrect procedures were used until a serious problem cropped up. These work practices
and ways of thinking affect many aspects of plant performance, so their recognition and
change has broad potential impact.
Third, data accessibility is absolutely critical for effective root cause analysis, and
effective operations in general. Investigations are done immediately in the nuclear power
industry, with a rule-of-thumb that people start to forget important detail in two days. In
the case of these root cause teams in the chemical plant, they were investigating events
that were weeks, months, or years old. Key informants change jobs, forget details, and
even the physical information changes. For example, for one of the team investigations it
turned out that a key source of information was continuous process data stored in the
plant computers. However, the computers store that information for only one week and
then erase the information, maintaining in permanent storage only less informative
averages. This particular team got very lucky when a repeat event occurred during their
analysis.
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Fourth, the composition of teams that crossed disciplinary and hierarchical
boundaries conveys an implicit message that no one person or group knows everything
needed to solve the problems of the plant. There is a necessary strength to bringing the
information and viewpoints of multiple kinds of people to bear on problems, and there are
additional payoffs in the form of information exchange, new working relationships, and
mutual respect. For example, because the teams began with problems organized around
technical features of the equipment, it was natural for team members with technical
competence to take their normal role as "expert" and assume that they and only they can
provide answers for the plant. In the early interaction of several teams, there were
particular engineers whose behavior could only be characterized as arrogant: they
assumed there was a technical answer and that nontechnical team members were unable to
contribute to the discussion and could only waste their time. Not surprisingly, there were
some unpleasant team interactions. Yet, over the course of the analysis, these engineers
began to realize that obvious technical "fixes" were not emerging; as problems were traced
back they turned out to have underlying causes in work practices and culture involving
designers, operators, maintainers, and managers. For these problems, the engineers were
not the experts and, in fact, might be myopic in their understanding of human behavior and
need the insights of others on the team. This is a humbling but potentially very powerful
experience.
DISCUSSION
Differences Between Nuclear Power Plants and Chemical Process Plants
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Both nuclear power plants and chemical process plants struggle to avoid problems and,
when problems occur, to take corrective actions based on their understanding of causes.
There are considerable similarities in the incident review and root cause analysis
approaches taken by these industries, partly because they each pay attention to other
industries' practices. However, the two examples in this paper are directed at rather
different kinds of problems. In the nuclear power plant, the incident review process is
engaged typically by a single incident, which may range from a serious event involving
damage to equipment, personnel injury, or unplanned shutdown to what appears to be a
very minor mistake with no consequences, such as a fire door improperly left open, tools
left lying around, or maintenance work carried out without proper clearance or "tagging."
Attention is paid to these small incidents not only because of financial or safety
consequences, but because of the potential consequences driven by a belief that the
accumulation of small incidents increases the probability of a major problem such as Three
Mile Island. In the chemical plant, the typical problem was an intermittent but repetitive
deviation from a designed chemical or physical process that cost the company thousands
or tens of thousands of dollars for each occurrence. Each single incident was tolerated
and small adjustments were made locally by a particular operator, engineer, or
maintenance worker. The combined impact of these incidents was hardly considered until
the root cause intervention.
The nuclear power technology has highly coupled systems of equipment that
interact in complex ways; it is the complexity of minor problems cascading in combination
into major problems that worries the industry. As they say, the serious problems occur
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when "all the holes line up." Intense public scrutiny is placed on the nuclear power
industry because of the potential for catastrophe (Chernobyl) and dread of radiation
(Slovic, 1987; Weart, 1988). The only way to prevent this is to prevent even the "minor"
problems and to learn to recover quickly from problems so the plant is not in an unusual
configuration and vulnerable to subsequent errors and surprises.
Since TMI, the nuclear power industry has worked very hard to correct equipment
problems and train operators intensively. Equipment that could not be fixed was replaced
or redesigned. Many more employees were hired to do more designing, more
maintenance, have additional operators on every shift with engineering backgrounds and
responsibility for the big picture, quality control, regulatory compliance, and management.
One plant that ran with 150 employees in 1975 had 950 employees in 1992, which in the
context of deregulation has created enormous new financial pressures. The result is that
fewer problems are now occurring (but more attention is paid to less serious ones) but
those that do occur are more difficult to understand, involve combinations of causes,
almost always have human errors and programmatic issues, and have far less objective
data associated with them. To address these problems, general problem solving skills,
common sense, and the collection of technical information from within the plant are not
enough. Everyone is struggling with how to understand and make improvements to
organizational and cultural factors.
Systems Thinking and Organizational Learning
In any industry, well-intentioned, commonplace solutions can fail to help, have unintended
side effects, or even exacerbate problems. When problems are understood in linear cause-
24
effect terms that results in a search for "fixes," it is common to find a "fixes that fail"
scenario (Senge, 1990), as exemplified in Figure 3. Blaming and disciplining particular
individuals, intended to encourage accountability, can create an environment in which
people do not report problems. For example, when the Federal Aviation Administration
provided immunity from prosecution for pilots who reported near midair collisions, the
number of reports tripled; when immunity was retracted, the number of reports dropped
by a factor of six (Tamuz, 1994). Under such conditions, problems cannot be addressed
early, trending is incomplete, and the result can be more problems. Similarly, increased
procedural detail and monitoring of compliance, intended to ensure the quality of work,
can be perceived as mistrust and regimentation. This may result in loss of motivation,
blind compliance to procedures that may still be incomplete, malicious compliance when
workers know the right thing to do but also know that only rote compliance is safe from
disciplinary action, the departure of skilled workers who find more interesting work
elsewhere, and, ultimately, more problems.
Insert Figure 3
From this viewpoint, the incident review process should have learning rather than
fixing as its goal. For example, incidents would not be approached with the expectation of
finding the single "root" cause of the problem, nor is there a "solution" to the problem.
Instead, the incident becomes an occasion to identify and discuss issues, to encourage new
insights, and to explore possibilities for change and their consequences. I believe that an
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important reason for the success of benchmarking, total quality management, quantitative
indicator tracking, and business process reengineering is that the veneer of quantitative
modeling legitimates their hidden function of promoting discussion and collaborative
learning. This suggests why, all too often, these approaches become new "fixes" that
apply limited solutions with disappointing results. Antidotes to this myopia depend upon
broader participation and discussion among specialized groups, and can be facilitated by
new conceptual lenses (theories) and modeling tools to organize dynamic
interdependencies (Senge and Sterman, 1991).
One example of the value of a learning orientation to promote collaboration of
theorists, researchers, and operating personnel comes from Du Pont Chemicals (Carroll,
Sterman, and Marcus, in press), whose chemical process plants were plagued with
equipment failures. In the context of company-wide cost-reduction efforts, a
benchmarking study showed that Du Pont spent more than its competitors on
maintenance, yet had worse equipment availability. A culture of reactive fire-fighting had
developed, with workers regularly pulled off jobs to do corrective maintenance.
Responding to the benchmarking study, a series of cost-cutting initiatives were undertaken
that had no lasting impact. Finally, one team questioned the basic assumption that
reducing maintenance costs could help reduce overall manufacturing costs; they thought
that the effects of maintenance activities were tightly linked to so many aspects of plant
performance that no one really understood the overall picture.
Du Pont was able to improve maintenance only after a collaborative conceptual
breakthrough. An internal team developed a dynamic model of the system of relationships
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around maintenance (a "modeling for learning" exercise with the assistance of a
researcher/consultant, Senge and Sterman, 1991). However, they were unable to transmit
the systemic lessons of the model through ordinary means. Instead, the team created an
experiential game in which plant employees play the roles of functional managers and
discover new ways to think about plant activities, share their experiences and ideas, and
test programs and policies. Having a broad range of employees with a system-wide
understanding of the relationships between operations, maintenance, quality, and costs laid
the groundwork for a successful pump maintenance pilot program.
Mobilizing Change
There is a crucial transition between analysis and implementation that is difficult to
manage. Many nuclear power plants complain that they have wonderful written analyses
but nothing changes. There are difficult "hand-offs" between the root cause team and the
line managers who must take action. There are problems in recommending quick fixes
that do not address the real causes; sometimes that is what management is demanding of
the teams. There are shortages of resources and an unwillingness to commit to longer-
term efforts in the face of daily demands. There is resistance to change and cynicism
about the "program of the month." Sometimes it takes a major personnel change (such as
firing a plant manager or vice president) to unfreeze people and open the space for new
actions.
At one troubled nuclear power plant, senior management commissioned a Self-
Assessment Team to work full-time for several months re-analyzing the reports from over
20 serious recent incidents, and then to act as "change agents" to jump start corrective
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actions. The team developed a detailed set of causal categories and a list of issues, which
were investigated further through semi-structured interviews with over 250 employees of
the utility. From these data, the team created a list of 15 problems organized in three
groupings: (1) Management Philosophy, Skills and Practices; (2) People Performing the
Work; and (3) Problem Solving and Follow-Up. In particular, two items within the
Management grouping were considered highest priority and most fundamental:
supervisory practices and risk assessment and prioritization. The Team was careful to
illustrate each problem statement with concrete examples of events and interview
quotations, and to link the problem statements back to the original symptomatic events.
Each problem statement was then turned over to an action group comprising one
or more "customer," "suppliers," executive sponsors, and team member change agents.
The roles of customer and supplier, a relatively new terminology for this organization, are
products of its quality improvement process. However, the problems in the Management
grouping were not turned over to an action group; instead, management collectively took
responsibility for these issues. Although this was described as a legitimate strategy to
force management "buy-in" and ownership, it is also a way for management to close ranks
and prevent other employees from exerting control. Subsequently, this initiative dissipated
in the face of new problems and wholesale changes in top management.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described some learning activities, specifically the self-analysis of operating
problems, in the nuclear power and chemical process industries. The analyses and
examples illustrate that the logic of learning is fundamentally different from the logic of
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fixing, and requires both discipline and support. People are rarely encouraged to look at
the linkages among problems and issues, because it creates a feeling of overwhelming
complexity and hopelessness. Especially when faced with pressure to do something
quickly, it is difficulty to argue for a slow and uncertain approach. Yet, given
encouragement, resources, and helpful conceptual lenses, it is possible to consider multiple
issues rather than a single root cause, to look beyond individuals who made errors to the
organizations and systems that set them up for errors, and to raise issues about accepted
practices and high status groups that are usually too powerful to be challenged. When
that is done, we must also recognize that change will take time, commitment, and
sustained resources. That is why it is so instructive to participate with companies that are
trying to take a deeper look at themselves and to initiate lasting change, even though it is a
lengthy and challenging process.
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NOTES
*Many of the ideas in this paper came directly or indirectly from Dr. Constance Perin
during our collaborative research. A version of this paper was presented under the title
"Failures to Learn from Experience: An Analysis of Incident Reviews in Nuclear Power
Plants and Chemical Process Plants" in the Symposium "High Stakes Learning: Making
Sense of Unusual, High-Hazard Events" at the Academy of Management meetings,
Cincinnati, August, 1996.
[ 1 ] The MIT International Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety was
supported by a consortium of utilities, suppliers, vendors, and foundations from the
U.S. and other countries, who provided financial resources, access to sites and staff,
and collaboration.
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Figure 2
Organizational Learning Framework
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Figure 3
Fixes That Fail
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